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This paper explores if more generous social spending polices in fact lead to less income 
inequality, or if redistributive outcomes are offset by behavioral disincentive effects. To 
account for the inherent endogeneity of social policies with regard to inequality levels, I apply 
the System GMM estimator and use the presumably random incidence of certain diseases as 
instruments for social spending levels. The regression results suggest that more social 
spending effectively reduces inequality levels. The result is robust with respect to the 
instrument count and different data restrictions. Looking at the structure of benefits, 
particularly unemployment benefits and public pensions are responsible for the inequality 
reducing impact. More targeted benefits, however, do not significantly reduce income 
inequality. Rather, their positive effect on pre-government income inequality hints at 
substantial disincentive effects. 
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The relationship between redistributive policies and income inequality has gener-
ated much debate among social scientists and policy makers. Particularly the equity
e¢ ciency trade-o⁄is fundamental in the public ￿nance literature and state interven-
tions are often considered as e¢ ciency decreasing. Market forces alone, however, do
not necessarily bring about a desirable distribution of income with regard to equity
aspects. This is seen as a justi￿cation for government intervention and it is widely
accepted that public policies can play a key role in redistributing income. However,
while there is supposedly no doubt that all nations would ceteris paribus prefer less
income inequality among their citizens, they di⁄er dramatically in the extent to
which they reach this goal. Therefore, understanding the di⁄erences in the design of
￿scal and social policies and their corresponding distributive outcomes is of crucial
importance not only to public economics but also to other social sciences.
Using a dynamic panel approach with European countries and a time period
from 1993 until 2007, this paper studies the question whether a more generous wel-
fare state is indeed causally related to more equality in the distribution of incomes.
Beside the overall e⁄ect of social spending, this study also asks which kind of be-
ne￿ts are most e⁄ective in reducing income inequality by looking at the speci￿c
structure and characteristics of bene￿ts. Particularly, the theoretical framework of
the analysis elaborates in how far inequality reducing ￿rst-round e⁄ects might be
o⁄set by negative behavioral responses which are induced by redistributive social
policies. As a consequence, the total e⁄ect on income inequality is ambigous. While
the most extensive part of the empirical analysis looks at the determinants of post-
government income inequality (i.e. the overall e⁄ect), behavioral second-order e⁄ects
are identi￿ed by using next-period pre-government income inequality as dependent
variable.
Generally, my approach can be regarded as part of the large body of literature
that tries to identify the determinants of income inequality in cross-national com-
parison (see Atkinson and Brandolini (2004) for a survey). One of the most tested
theories of the evolution of income inequality is the well-known Kuznets-hypothesis
(Kuznets (1955)) which predicts an inverted-U relationship between inequality and
the level of economic development (see among others: Galor and Tsiddon (1996);
Barro (2000), Li et al. (2000)). Further studies focus on other macroeconomic factors
such as globalization (Edwards (1997), Alderson and Nielsen (2002), Dreher and
1Gaston (2008)), in￿ ation (Bulir and Gulde (1995), Galli and van der Hoeven (2001))
or ￿nancial development (Clarke et al. (2006)) to explain variations in income in-
equality across countries.
The e⁄ect of institutional factors on income inequality has been analyzed less.
This is certainly due to the inherent endogeneity of policies with respect to inequal-
ity levels. As social policies might be thought of as a mechanism to reduce income
inequality, they might also be determined by inequality levels. This raises the prob-
lem of reverse causality. Recently, a couple of studies have become available which
focus on the impact of labor market institutions on income inequality, using instru-
mental variable approaches to handle endogeneity issues. For example, Checchi and
Garc￿a-Peæalosa (2008, 2010) develop a formal model of how the labor share, union
density and unemployment bene￿ts in￿ uence income inequality. Using three-stage
least squares they ￿nd that labor market institutions indeed reduce income inequal-
ity but that this e⁄ect is associated with higher unemployment rates. Calder￿n and
Chong (2009) apply the System GMM-IV approach and ￿nd that both de jure and
de facto labor market regulations tend to improve the equality of incomes. They
also evaluated the e⁄ect of separate regulations and reveal distinct e⁄ects. In the
context of ￿scal policies, Duncan and Peter (2008) analyze the e⁄ect of the struc-
tural progressivity of income taxes on inequality in observed and true incomes. They
use a two-stage least squares approach with weighted averages of tax/progressivity
measures in neighboring countries as instruments for their ￿scal policy variable.
Although the majority of studies of inequality determinants also controls for
the impact of social spending, to the best of my knowledge the e⁄ect of social
policies as key explanatory variable of income inequality has not yet been analyzed.
Also, none of these studies has accounted for the endogeneity of social policies with
respect to income inequality. Thus, in line with Dreher and Gaston (2008) and
Calder￿n and Chong (2009) I apply the System GMM estimator which is capable of
dealing with the issue of reverse causality in a dynamic panel design to evaluate the
impact of social policies on income inequality. Instead of only relying on internal
instruments, however, I also use the presumably random incidence of certain diseases
to instrument for the possible endogeneity of redistributive policies.
The regression results suggest that a larger redistributive budget is strongly re-
lated to lower income inequality levels. The e⁄ect also remains robust when using
di⁄ering numbers of instruments and data restrictions, supporting a causal e⁄ect
of social spending levels on income inequality. Looking at the structure of bene-
2￿ts, particularly the age-related and unemployment bene￿ts are responsible for the
inequality reducing impact. More targeted bene￿ts, however, do not signi￿cantly
reduce income inequality. Rather, the positive e⁄ect on pre-government income
inequality hints at the importance of possible disincentive e⁄ects associated with
means-testing.
The setup of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 I introduce the
theoretical considerations underlying the analysis. Section 3 describes the data and
methodology. Section 4 presents the regression results and Section 5 concludes by
summarizing the main ￿ndings.
2 Theoretical Framework
In the following, I will outline some mechanisms which relate the welfare state to
income inequality, where the term ￿ welfare state￿is used shorthand for the total
of social bene￿ts provided by the state. The objective, however, is not to provide
a complete theoretical picture of all possible e⁄ects of policies which in￿ uence in-
equality but to highlight some major mechanisms to develop testable hypotheses.
The focus of this study is certainly the empirical exploration of the impact of social
spending on income inequality.
At a ￿rst sight, the impact of the welfare state on income inequality seems trivial,
since as long as social bene￿ts are somehow redistributive, the ￿rst-round e⁄ect on
the inequality of post-government incomes is by de￿nition negative. This e⁄ective re-
distributive e⁄ect is usually measured in micro studies by comparing pre-government
income inequality with the inequality in post-transfer incomes. Indeed, Immervoll
et al. (2005), Whiteford (2008) and Fuest et al. (forthcoming) ￿nd substantial redis-
tributive e⁄ects of social bene￿ts. Consequently one might expect a negative e⁄ect of
social bene￿ts on income inequality. However, this standard approach of measuring
redistribution is problematic because it neglects the fact that the pre-government
distribution of income is not independent of welfare state policies. Social bene￿ts
are generally associated with behavioral second-order e⁄ects which then in￿ uence
the distribution of market incomes before government intervention. In fact, the
provision of income transfers might in￿ uence behaviour in manifold ways with each
having di⁄ering impacts on income inequality.1 Here, I will focus on the labor sup-
1Income transfers may have an impact on private savings and investments, on demographic
choices, the unemployment rate, consumption decisions and the formation of human capital (see
3ply related responses induced by social policies and their possible impact on the
distribution of incomes.
Generally, all forms of social protection create some disincentives to work. As
standard consumer theory suggests, any additional transfer payments shift the re-
cipients￿budget constraints which means that recipients have to work less to obtain
a given standard of living. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, the positive
income e⁄ect reduces labor supply. If the design of the bene￿t involves a bene￿t
reduction as income increases, this will impose an implicit marginal tax rate on
additional earnings which also unambiguously decreases labor supply. Supposing
that low income earners reduce their labor supply more than high income earners,
social bene￿ts will lead to an increase of pre-government income inequality. In the
empirical labor supply literature it is a robust ￿nding that average labor supply
elasticities (taking into account participation elasticities as well as hours of labor
supply) strongly decline with income (as pointed out in Rłed and Strłm (2002) and
also recently found in Aaberge and Colombino (2006)). If bene￿t levels discour-
age recipients from taking part in the labor market at all, this leads to an increase
in the unemployment rate which in turn also increases pre-government income in-
equality. Given these considerations I expect a positive e⁄ect of social bene￿ts on
pre-government income inequality.2 Thus, taking into account second-order disin-
centive e⁄ects, the redistributive e⁄ects of social bene￿ts might be smaller than the
micro studies would suggest. In fact, at the macro level the distributional e⁄ect of
social bene￿ts on post-government income is a priori not clear. The hypothesized
e⁄ects of the welfare state on pre- and post-government income inequality are also
illustrated in Figure 1.
In the previous paragraph, hypotheses of the overall e⁄ect of total social spend-
ing on income inequality were developed. However, the ￿ welfare state￿is a com-
plex construct which consists of several di⁄erent social programmes each having
di⁄erent objectives and thus, di⁄erent e⁄ects on the distribution of pre- and post-
government incomes. Most generally, social bene￿t programmes can be divided into
Danziger et al. (1981) for further references). In addition, the ￿nancing sources of bene￿ts such
as taxes and contributions are also associated with their own behavorial responses which are not
discussed here.
2The ￿ redistributive paradoxon￿as introduced by Sinn (1995) strengthens the expectation of a
positive e⁄ect of the welfare state on pre-government income inequality. The underlying argument
is that the social security system induces increasing investment in risky assets and moral hazard
e⁄ects. Therefore, paradoxically, more redistribution may result in more post-tax inequality.
4two groups: Social insurance versus social assistance bene￿ts (Danziger et al. (1981),
Barr (2004)). Whereas social assistance bene￿ts are generally provided on the basis
of an income test to help people with low other incomes, the main objective of social
insurance bene￿ts is to maintain income in the face of adverse risks (such as unem-
ployment, disability and sickness) or to redistribute across the life-cycle (age-related
bene￿ts, family-related bene￿ts).
Figure 1: Social Spending Policies and Income Inequality
These di⁄erent objectives of the di⁄erent bene￿t functions imply di⁄erent ex-
pectations about their distributional outcomes.3 For example, insurance-related
bene￿ts such as unemployment, sickness and disability bene￿ts need not necessarily
be organised to redistribute from the rich to the poor. In the case of insurance-
related bene￿ts one does not have to claim ￿nancial need, but eligibility and bene￿t
level depend on past contributions and the event of unemployment, illness or in-
validity. If the bene￿ts are completely actuarial and are exclusively designed to
maintain status and income, they should have no equalizing e⁄ect. However, in
most developed countries, the social insurance bene￿ts of low income earners are
disproportionally higher than their past contributions. Redistribution also occurs if
bene￿t claims are more common in the low income part of the population, which
is often the case. The argumentation in the context of public pensions is similar:
Although redistribution is not an inherent part of pensions, most systems apply
some redistributive formula which favors the poor. With respect to family-related
programmes, they usually imply redistribution (from rich to poor and across the
life-cycle) since most families with children are typically in the younger segments of
the populations which are characterized by low incomes. Housing bene￿ts, on the
other hand, are directly designed to help recipients to meet the cost of housing and
3The following explanations about expected distributional outcomes of di⁄erent social bene￿ts
mainly draw upon Barr (1992) and Barr (2004).
5eligibility is usually based on a kind of ￿nancial need test. Similar as in the case of
pure social assistance bene￿ts (such as an minimum income guarantee), their main
motive is vertical equity. Consequently, their expected ￿rst-round e⁄ect on income
inequality is particularly high. Housing bene￿ts and minimum income guarantees
generally belong to the category of social assistance bene￿ts.
With respect to the incentive e⁄ects related to these di⁄erent bene￿t functions,
it is certainly possible to identify some expectations about typical behavioral e⁄ects.
For example, it is generally assumed that extremely high unemployment bene￿ts (re-
placement rates) provide little ￿nancial incentives to work, causing ￿ unemployment
traps￿(Barr (2004), p.179; Meyer (2002)) which in turn increase pre-government
income inequality. In the context of public pensions and labor supply-related re-
sponses, it is discussed if they induce early-retirement (Gruber and Wise (1998);
Blundell et al. (2002)).4 Family-related bene￿ts are often expected to reduce the
labor supply of second-earners. In the case of unemployment bene￿ts, however, em-
pirical evidence suggests that labor supply depends more on other characteristics
such as the maximum duration of bene￿ts than on the pure level of bene￿ts (Atkin-
son and Micklewright (1991)). Furthermore, many programmes involve some further
eligibility conditions (e.g. working-tax credits, in-work bene￿ts) which may partly
o⁄set behavioral disincentive e⁄ects (Blundell (2000)). Thus, to develop testable
hypotheses of the behavioral e⁄ects of di⁄erent bene￿t functions, further informa-
tion on the speci￿c design and ￿nancing of the programme is needed. So, the overall
e⁄ect of di⁄erent bene￿t functions on post-government income inequality remains
an empirical matter.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the e⁄ect of means-tested bene￿ts on pre-government
income inequality is less controversial. Means-tested bene￿ts generally involve a re-
duction in the level of bene￿ts as earnings increase. This leads to implicit marginal
tax rates above 100 percent and major labor-supply disincentives (Danziger et al.
(1981); Pestieau (2006)). As means-tested bene￿ts are expected to reduce labor
supply more for low income earners than for high income earners, pre-government
income inequality is expected to increase (Bergh (2005)). Therefore equalizing ￿rst-
round e⁄ects of more targeting are likely to be counteracted by negative behavioral
e⁄ects on pre-government income inequality.5 As Atkinson (1995) states ￿ the case
4Another debate relates to the question whether public pensions reduce private savings (see
for example Feldstein (1974)), with negative e⁄ects on economic growth and adverse e⁄ects on
aggregate income inequality.
5Korpi and Palme￿ s (1998) considerations of less political support and smaller redistributive
6for greater targeting is typically based on the assumption of a ￿xed total budget for
the social security ministry ... Account has to be taken of changes in the behaviour
of recipients, and the limits to targeting may arise from the adverse incentives cre-
ated￿ (p. 224). Accordingly, I expect a clear positive e⁄ect of the proportion of
means-tested bene￿ts on pre-governement income inequality. The overall e⁄ect on
post-government income inequality, though, is a priori not clear.
Figure 1 also illustrates the endogeneity problem of social programmes with re-
spect to inequality in the pre-government distribution of incomes. Following the
famous median voter theorem, higher inequality levels may also lead to higher re-
distribution (Meltzer and Richard (1981)). I will deal with this issue of reverse
causality in the empirical part of the paper. The Figure also hints at further control
variables which are expected to have an in￿ uence an on income inequality. The
choice of indicators is based on previous analyses of income inequality determinants
mentioned above. Basically I will use three sorts of indicators, such as macroeco-
nomic factors, socio-economic society characteristics and indicators for the in￿ uence
of labor market institutions, which are explained in the next section.
3 Data and Methods
The dependent variable of the main part of the empirical analysis is the Gini Coef-
￿cient of equivalised disposable income.6 Disposable income means factor income
originally earned at the market minus taxes plus social transfers and which therefore
represents the income which ￿nally matters for the individual. The unit of analysis
is the individual and to compensate for di⁄erent household structures and possible
economies of scales within households, I use equivalised household incomes for the
computation of Gini coe¢ cients. For each person, the equivalised (per-capita) total
net income is its household total net income divided by the equivalised household
size according to the modi￿ed OECD scale.7 The data for the Gini coe¢ cient is
budgets in the case of greater low-income targeting also provide arguments for counteracting e⁄ects
of redistributive e⁄ects of means-testing.
6In case of maximum inequality the standardised Gini coe¢ cient equals one, and it corresponds
to zero when all incomes are equal. Concerning the sensitivity on the distribution scale, the Gini
coe¢ cient attaches most weight to transfers among mid-level incomes.
7The modi￿ed OECD scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the head of household, 0.5 to every
household member aged 14 or more and 0.3 to each child aged less than 14. Summing up the
individual weights gives the household speci￿c equivalence factor.
7based on three di⁄erent micro data sources. Data for the income reference period
1993 until 2000 is based on the ECHP (European Community Household Panel), a
household survey with a common conceputal framework conducted in the member
states of the EU, co-ordinated by the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Communites
(Eurostat). The survey basically covers the old EU-15 member states, although data
for Austria (1993), Finland (1993, 1994) and Sweden (1993-1995) is missing for the
￿rst periods. Gini coe¢ cients for the year 2001 are based on the statistics of the
baseline tax bene￿t systems of EUROMOD, a microsimulation model for European
countries.8 Gini Coe¢ cients from 2003 until 2006 are based on EU-SILC (Statist-
ics on Income and Living Conditions) micro data, which is the successor of ECHP
data. The EU-SILC provides harmonised cross-sectional and longitudinal multidi-
mensional micro data on income and social exclusion in European countries. After
its start in 2003 with 7 European countries, in the 2004 wave it covered all old EU-
15 member states except Germany, Netherlands and the UK (Gini Coe¢ cients for
these countries are also taken from the EUROMOD statistics). Since wave 2005, the
dataset covers the 25 EU member states (except Malta), plus Norway and Iceland.
Overall I have 223 observations for the Gini coe¢ cient of post-government income,
until 2003 basically covering the EU-15 countries and from 2004 onwards also the
new European member states (except Malta, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria) plus
Norway which is also included in the sample. Unfortunately I have no data for 2002
because there are no comparable data sources for the EU-15 that year. Also, there
is an unavoidable disruption in the time series of indicators produced when using
di⁄erent data surveys which has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.9
However, this is the best annual data available for EU member states. In fact, the
cross-national comparability of the micro data and the time period covered are ma-
jor contributions of this study.10 Particularly, the usage of micro data ensures that
8EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable Income, accessed
at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/statistics/ using EUROMOD version no. D21
(June 2008). For further information on EUROMOD, see e.g. Sutherland (2001), Lietz and
Mantovani (2006) and Sutherland (2007).
9In various robustness checks, however, I check in how far this structural break in￿ uences the
results. Also, I restrict the sample to EU-15 countries and EU-SILC data only. The results are
illustrated in the Appendix.
10See Atkinson & Brandolini (2001, p. 772) who comment on the pitfalls in the use of secondary
inequality data: ￿Gini coe¢ cients of income inequality may be published for a range of countries,
but there is no agreed basis of de￿nition. [...] We cannot therefore be sure whether results of
comparative or econometric analyses obtained using such data are genuine or a product of data
di⁄erences.￿
8all Gini coe¢ cients are based on the same income concept.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Post-Government Gini Coefficient 223 29.02 4.43 20.48 39.24
Pre-Government Gini Coeffient 80 48.40 3.43 38.80 55.30
Social benefits / GDP 223 23.90 5.03 11.90 32.60
Means-tested / Soc Ben 223 9.08 6.55 0.82 33.12
Unemployment / Soc Ben 223 7.11 4.07 0.90 21.68
Family-related / Soc Ben 223 9.19 3.49 1.89 17.58
Invalidity / Soc Ben 223 9.39 3.31 3.75 19.06
Health and sickness / Soc Ben 223 27.72 4.61 17.53 42.66
Old-age and survivor / Soc Ben 223 43.26 7.92 24.68 64.09
Housing and exclusion / Soc Ben 223 3.33 2.06 0.11 7.78
GDP per capita (in 1000$) 223 31.36 14.30 6.19 78.89
 GDP per capita squared (in 1000$) 223 1187.28 1084.45 38.26 6223.79
Dependency ratio 223 49.14 3.33 39.36 59.05
Proportion higher education 223 63.28 18.47 17.80 90.30
Union density 223 37.87 21.26 8.00 85.10
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
In the second part of the analysis I also use the Gini coe¢ cient of market in-
comes as dependent variable, meaning incomes before any redistributive government
intervention. Unfortunately data on pre-government incomes is only available from
2003 onwards and then only for a limited country sample. Altogether this makes
at most 80 observations for the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-government incomes. Still,
comparability concerns decrease as the computation of all pre-government Gini coef-
￿cients base on a single data source, which is EU-SILC micro data. Throughout the
analysis, Gini coe¢ cients are measured on a scale from 0 to 100. Descriptive stat-
istics for the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-government and post-government incomes are
illustrated in Table 1.
Following the theoretical framework outlined above, the key explanatory vari-
ables of the analysis are indicators for the social spending structure of the welfare
state. All data for these variables is taken from the Eurostat database. So I use
total social bene￿ts to operationalize the overall spending generosity of the welfare
state. Social bene￿ts encompass all expenditures incurred by social protection sys-
tems apart from any operating expenditures. However, there are critical views of
using such data.11 In fact, it would be more accurate to use for example net social
11See for example De Deken and Kittel (2007) who critically assess using data on social expendit-
ures as they are available in Eurostat. For further information on methodological issues regarding
variables of the spending dimension of social protection schemes see European Commission (1996).
9expenditures which also take into account the impact of taxation and private bene￿ts
on social expenditures (see Adema and Ladaique (2009)). Unfortunately, this data
is not available for the countries and time period I cover. Throughout the analysis,
total social bene￿ts are expressed as proportion of GDP to account for di⁄erent
country sizes. To analyze the impact of di⁄erent social spending categories on in-
come inequality, I basically rely on the di⁄erent bene￿t functions of the core system
of the Social Protection Statistics provided by Eurostat. Thus, I look at unem-
ployment, family, health and invalidity-related bene￿ts separately. I add survivors￿
bene￿ts to the category of old-age-related bene￿ts and combine housing and social
exclusion bene￿ts, whereas social exclusion bene￿ts only represent a small residual
function in the Eurostat Social Protection Statistics.12 To measure the degree of
low income targeting of welfare states I apply the proportion of means-tested social
bene￿ts as percent of total social bene￿ts. Means-tested bene￿ts are social bene￿ts
which are explicitly or implicitly conditional on the bene￿ciary·s income and/or
wealth falling below a speci￿c level. Descriptive Statistics for the key explanatory
variables are shown in Table 1.
Beside social spending, obviously, there are also a number of further variables
which are expected to have an in￿ uence on income inequality. The choice of indicat-
ors which I will control for in my empirical anaylsis is based on previous studies on
income inequality determinants, which are brie￿ y surveyed at the beginning of the
paper. Thus, I include three sorts of indicators, such as macroeconometric factors,
socio-economic society characteristics and indicators for the in￿ uence of labor mar-
ket institutions. As macroeconomic indicators I use GDP per capita (measured in
constant international 1000 $) and GDP per capita squared to control for the ag-
gregate income levels of countries. The data for the level of economic development is
taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank Group.
Variables which represent the socio-demographic and -economic structure of the
society such as the dependency ratio (the proportion of population aged under 15
and over 64 as percent of total population) and the proportion of the population aged
between 25 and 64 which has at least a higher secondary education are again from
the Eurostat database.
Measures of the in￿ uence of labor market institutions are taken from the ICT-
WSS Database: Database on International Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage
12See European Commission (1996) for further information on the de￿nition of di⁄erent spending
categories in the Social Protection Statistics as published by Eurostat.
10Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007.
Union density presents the net union membership as proportion of wage and salary
earners in employment.13 Finally, I also include a dummy for post-socialist new EU
member states since their inequality levels may di⁄er for reasons not captured by
the aforementioned control variables.
As has been indicated, this study is based on an unbalanced, pooled cross-
sectional time series (CSTS) of at most 183 cases in 24 European countries. To
empirically estimate the hypotheses derived in section 2 I will use a reduced form
equation such as
yit = ￿yi;t￿1 + ￿Sit + ￿Xit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (1)
with yit as the inequality measure of country i at time point t which is either the
Gini coe¢ cient of post-government income or the Gini coe¢ cient of pre-government
income.
Sit represents the variable of interest, the overall generosity of the welfare state,
represented by total social bene￿ts per GDP. X is a vector of control variables as
explained in the previous section. Finally ui presents country-speci￿c e⁄ects, ut
period-speci￿c e⁄ects and "it the idiosyncratic error term. The lagged dependent
variable is included because income inequality is rather persistent over time. In the
presence of country ￿xed e⁄ects, OLS will lead to biased and inconsitent estimates
in this dynamic panel setting.14 Thus my preferred method of estimation is Sys-
tem GMM which was introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998). More speci￿cally,
I use the System GMM estimator as implemented by Roodman (2009b) in Stata.
In contrast to Di⁄erence GMM (Arellano and Bond (1991)) where di⁄erences are
instrumented with levels, the Blundell-Bond estimator instruments levels with dif-
ferences. The underlying idea is that in the presence of persistent processes past
changes may be more predicitve of current levels than past levels of current changes.
Thus the instruments become more relevant. System GMM uses both, the equation
13Within robustness checks I also included GDP growth, the in￿ ation and unemployment rate,
population growth and di⁄erent openness indicators as additional control variables. I dropped
these variables in the ￿nal estimations because they either did not prove to have a signi￿cant
impact on inequality or due to multicollinearity concerns. However, the inclusion of these addional
controls did not substantially change the results.
14In fact, OLS will tend to produce an upward bias in the coe¢ cient of the dependent variable,
for a ￿xed e⁄ects model, the opposite is true. Thus, a valid speci￿cation should produce coe¢ cient
estimates for the lagged dependent variable which lie within or near this range of estimates.
11in di⁄erences and the equation in levels. Thus, System GMM also allows to include
time-invariant variables in the level equation.
In some additional speci￿cations I will also analyze the impact of speci￿c social
programs Sk (such as unemployment bene￿ts, family-related bene￿ts, old-age related
bene￿ts and so on) on income inequality. To avoid omitted variable biases I also
inlcude a measure of total social bene￿ts less the speci￿c bene￿ts k in question
(S
1￿k
it ) to simultaneously control for other social bene￿ts:15




it + ￿Xit + ￿i + ￿t + "it (2)
The Di⁄erence and System GMM regression approaches are particularly useful
because they can deal with endogenous regressors and reverse causality. Since I
look at the impact of social policies on income inequality, there is no appropriate
counterfactual without the social policy in place. In fact, in my particular setting,
the long established median voter theorem suggests that higher inequality could also
lead to more redistribution (Meltzer and Richard (1981)). Accordingly, inequality
levels might also in￿ uence the design of redistributive policies. This possible re-
verse causality implies that the results for the generosity of the welfare state are
likely to be biased upwards. Generally, System GMM is intended to build internal
instruments for the predetermined dependent and additional endogenous regressor
variables. However, to particularly deal with the endogeneity of my social policy
variable, I also include external instruments in my estimations. Particularly in the
macro context of developed countries appropriate instruments, and therefore an
exogenous variation in social spending, are di¢ cult to ￿nd. The present paper uses
the presumably random incidence of certain diseases to instrument for the possible
endogeneity of redistributive policies. Unfortunately comparable data on the incid-
ence of such diseases is rare. Finally I include the number of hospital discharges of
multiple sclerosis per 100,000 and the standardized death rates of malignant melan-
oma of skin and malignat neoplasms of prostate as proxies for the incidence of these
diseases.16 I assume that they are not systematically related to behavioral e⁄ects,
15See Calder￿n and Chong (2009) for a similar approach to analyze the impact of speci￿c labor
market regulations on income inequality.
16Additionally I used the incidence of female breast cancer and the number of hospital dis-
charges of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue diseases from the European health for
all database (HFA-DB). However, data is only available for a very restricted sample of countries.
The corresponding results are qualitatively the same and can be obtained from the author upon
request.
12income and also income inequality but that the incidence of these diseases is not
clear and mainly lies in unsystematic genetic predisposition. On the other hand,
an increasing incidence of such diseases is obviously associated with an incrase in
health expenditures and can therefore be regarded as an exogenous variation in social
spending. Of course, the pure incidence of such dieseases would be more appropriate
because the indicators actually used might again be related with the social health
system of a particular country. However, such data is not available for a su¢ cient
number of countries. Beside the social spending variables and the lagged dependent
variables, I treat all other regressors as strictly exogenous, meaning they instrument
themselves.
System GMM involves many speci￿cation choices. In my case of a rather unbal-
anced panel, I use forward orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover (1995)) instead
of di⁄erences to maximize the sample size. Also, I apply the one-step estimator with
small sample correction and robust standard errors to account for heteroskedastic
error structures. Recently Roodman (2009a) discusses the problem of having too
many instruments which might over￿t endogenous variables. In fact, System GMM
uses all available instruments and the number of instruments increases quartic to the
number of time points. In my speci￿c setting of N being only slightly larger than
T, this might particularly be an issue. Thus, I test the robustness of the results to
severly reducing the instrument count by collapsing instruments and restricting the
number of lags used as instruments. In addition, I look at the Di⁄erence-in-Hansen
test for the instruments of the level equation as recommended by Roodman (2009a).
Obviously, another concern in my setting is the structural break in the time series
of the underlying micro data for the Gini coe¢ cient. Thus, I conduct several ro-
bustness checks by testing for the existence of structural breaks in the full sample
and restrict the sample to using EU-SILC data only.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the results of the impact of total welfare spending on post-government
income inequality, measured by the Gini coe¢ cient of disposable income. The spe-
ci￿cation in column (1) uses all available instruments as suggested by the System
GMM estimator. As the results reveal, the lagged dependent variable is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero at a one percent signi￿cance level, emphasizing the persistance of
13inequality levels over time. Also, the ￿ndings in column (1) reveal a negative e⁄ect
of the overall generosity of the welfare state in terms of social bene￿ts per GDP. The
e⁄ect is signi￿cant at a ￿ve percent signi￿cance level. With respect to the macroe-
conomic control variables, the results support a U-shape relationship between GDP
per capita and income inequality. Accordingly, in line with comparable studies on
developed countries (e.g. Dreher and Gaston (2008)), the ￿ndings do not support
the Kuznet·s hypothesis of an inverted U-relationship between inequality and the
level of economic development. The dependency rate and the proportion of higher
education do not show signi￿cant e⁄ects on income inequality in this speci￿cation.
Post-socialist EU member states reveal income inequality levels which are on aver-
age 3 Gini points lower than in countries without a socialist history. According to
this spec￿cation, union density does not seem to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on income
inequality. As the identi￿cation statistics at the bottom of Table 1 suggest, the
speci￿cation passes the Sargan overidenti￿cation test and the Arellano-Bond test
of second-order serial correlation in the error terms. However, the perfect Hansen
statistic of 1.000 indicates that instrument proliferation might be an issue in this
speci￿cation with all available instruments.
Thus, in the next estimations I signi￿cantly reduce the instrument count by ￿rst
collapsing the instruments and then using only the collapsed second-lag instruments,
as suggested in Roodman (2009b) and Roodman (2009a). Even when severly redu-
cing the number of instruments, the e⁄ect of social spending on income inequality
remains signi￿cant, suggesting that redistributive ￿rst-round e⁄ects outweigh any
negative second-order e⁄ects. With respect to the other covariates, the lagged de-
pendent variable loses its signi￿cance in these speci￿cations, whereas the intuitive
positive e⁄ect of the dependency rate now turns signifcant. It should be noted
that speci￿cation (3) also passes the Di⁄erence-in-Hansen test for both, the full in-
strument set for the level equation as well as those based on the lagged dependent
variable, supporting the ￿nding of a causal e⁄ect from social spending on income
inequality.
14Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Post-Government Income
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Lagged Gini Coefficient 0.650*** 0.205 0.338
(0.088) (0.165) (0.219)
Social Benefits / GDP -0.157** -0.275** -0.329**
(0.062) (0.102) (0.124)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.150** -0.324*** -0.290***
(0.058) (0.089) (0.083)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency Rate 0.108 0.239* 0.224*
(0.076) (0.119) (0.118)
Prop Secondary Education -0.013 -0.048 -0.020
(0.014) (0.030) (0.035)
Post-communist -3.297** -5.052** -5.858***
(1.213) (1.901) (1.977)
Union density -0.009 -0.038* -0.029
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
Period Effects ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations 183 183 183
Number of countries 24 24 24
No of instruments 145 49 23
Sargan test 0.186 0.435 0.210
Hansen test 1.000 1.000 0.510
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.327 0.407 0.358
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and forward orthogonal







Table 2: Social Spending Generosity and Post-Government Income Inequality
As indicated above, another concern might be the structural break in the time
series of the underlying micro data for the Gini coe⁄cient. Therefore, Table 5 in
the Appendix also reports the results of some data robustness checks. In the ￿rst
speci￿cation, I restrict the sample to EU-15 member states to check the sensitivity
of the results with respect to the inclusion of new EU member states. The result
of social spending remains negative and signi￿cant. Yet, the p-value of the Sargan
test does not pass the ten percent level, indicating that the instruments may not
be valid in this speci￿cation. The second speci￿cation in Table 5 only uses EU-
15SILC micro data. Thus, all observations before 2003 are dropped and the number of
observations decreases to 75. Again, the inequality-reducing e⁄ect of social spending
is signi￿cant. Speci￿cation (3) indicates that indeed, inequality levels after the data
break in 2002 are on average one Gini point higher. Though, as the interaction
e⁄ect in the last column shows, this does not signi￿cantly in￿ uence the e⁄ect of
social spending on income inequality.17
The robustness of the results with respect to the instrument count and di⁄erent
data restrictions strongly supports a negative relationship between social spending
and income inequality. Therefore even if social bene￿ts might be associated with
negative disincentive e⁄ects which are positively correlated with pre-government in-
come inequality, the overall e⁄ect on post-government income inequality is negative.
Table 3 reports the e⁄ects of di⁄erent social bene￿ts on post-government in-
come inequality. The estimations basically follow equation (2) and estimate the
isolated e⁄ects of speci￿c bene￿ts, while simultaneously controlling for the rest of
social bene￿ts. The speci￿cation of each row is similar to the one in Table 1 column
(4), including the additional control variables and period e⁄ects. All models pass
the Sargan and second-order serial correlation tests. As the results show, only the
unemployment-related bene￿ts and the old-age and survivor bene￿ts reveal statist-
ically signi￿cant e⁄ects on income inequality. Both e⁄ects are negative, indicating
implicit redistribution formulas in both, unemployment and pension bene￿ts. The
e⁄ect of family-related bene￿ts is negative but not statistically sign￿cant. On the
other hand, the disability bene￿ts and health-related bene￿ts display positive signs,
which might give some support that they have other objectives rather than redistri-
bution. Though, both e⁄ects are statistically insigni￿cant. Although the ￿rst-round
e⁄ect of housing and social exclusion bene￿ts is expected to be clearly inequality
reducing, the overall e⁄ect on post-government income inequality is not signi￿cant
and positive. Thus there is some evidence that negative behavioral e⁄ects induced
by these social assistance bene￿ts outweigh their inequality decreasing ￿rst-round
e⁄ects. Overall, the results of Table 3 show that di⁄erent social bene￿t functions
display distinct e⁄ects on post-government income inequality. These ￿ndings indic-
ate that not the category of social assistance bene￿ts is responsible for the negative
e⁄ect of social spending on income inequality, but insurance-related bene￿ts such as
17Table 6 in the Appendix also illustrates the e⁄ects of social spending on income inequality
when using the OLS and FE estimator. The e⁄ects are similar and remain signi￿cant.
16unemployment and pension bene￿ts.18
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Post-Government Income
VARIABLES Coefficient Std.Dev. Obs. Sargan AB AR(2)
Social Benefits -0.275 ** 0.102 183 0.435 0.407
Unemployment -0.198 * 0.098 183 0.721 0.385
Family-related -0.139 0.169 183 0.596 0.409
Invalidity 0.053 0.145 183 0.778 0.465
Health-related 0.032 0.143 183 0.470 0.418
Old-age and survivor -0.119 ** 0.047 183 0.809 0.469
Housing and Exclusion 0.057 0.188 183 0.741 0.428
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full specification of each row includes the same control variables as the estimations in Table (1)
Column(4). System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction, forward
orthogonal deviations and collapsed instruments. All equations also include external instruments.
Table 3: Income Inequality and Di⁄erent Bene￿t Functions
Within the theoretical framework, I also derived expectations about the e⁄ects
of social spending and the bene￿t targeting structure on pre-government income
inequality. Therefore, in Table 4 I contrast the results of social spending and the
proportion of means-tested bene￿ts on post-government inequality with the corres-
ponding e⁄ects on pre-government income inequality. Column (1) is identical with
column (4) in Table 2. In the second speci￿cation I include the proportion of means-
tested bene￿ts along with the proportion of non-means-tested bene￿ts, to control
for the rest of social bene￿ts. Since in speci￿cations (3) and (4) I particularly try
to identify second-order behavioral e⁄ects which go along with social policies, I in-
clude lagged measures of social spending and means-tested bene￿ts.19 It should be
noted that the number of observations is rather small in these speci￿cations with
pre-government income inequality as dependent variable, since data is only available
for a restricted sample. In fact, estimations are only based on 56 observations in 20
countries.
18Using OLS and FE as estimation methods, beside unemployment bene￿ts also family-related
bene￿ts reveal a signi￿cant inequality reducing impact. Public pensions, though, lose its signi￿c-
ance in the FE model (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
19I should emphasize that the results remain qualitatively the same when including current
instead of lagged values for the social spending variables.
17Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Post- and Pre-Government Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Lagged Gini 0.205 0.401** 0.579*** 0.194
(0.165) (0.159) (0.200) (0.155)
(Lagged) Social Benefits -0.275** 0.130
(0.102) (0.085)
(Lagged) Means-tested / Soc Ben -0.047 0.479**
(0.147) (0.175)
(Lagged) Non means-tested -0.405* 0.364**
(0.201) (0.140)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.324*** -0.331** 0.317* -0.058
(0.089) (0.140) (0.171) (0.264)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.003*** 0.003* -0.003* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Dependency Rate 0.239* -0.026 0.080 0.596***
(0.119) (0.184) (0.160) (0.180)
Prop Secondary Education -0.048 -0.001 -0.038 -0.056
(0.030) (0.030) (0.044) (0.038)
Post-communist -5.052** -8.451** 5.087 8.771***
(1.901) (3.371) (3.313) (2.660)
Union density -0.038* -0.011 -0.055* -0.054*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.031)
Period Effects ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Observations 183 183 56 56
Number of countries 24 24 20 20
No of instruments 49 48 37 40
Sargan test 0.435 0.953 0.251 0.099
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.407 0.350 0.187 0.502
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction and forward orthogonal deviations.
Models (1) and (3) also include external instruments.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Post-Government Inequality Pre-Government Inequality
Table 4: Social Spending and Pre-Government Income Inequality
The results in column (2) suggest that the proportion of means-tested bene￿ts
does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on post-government income inequality, although
they are particurlarly targeted at low income groups. This ￿nding is line with the
previous ￿nding of housing and social exclusion bene￿ts, which make up a large part
of means-tested bene￿ts. When looking at the e⁄ects on pre-government inequality,
the lagged value of social bene￿ts reveals a positive correlation, though the e⁄ect is
not signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance levels. With respect to the lagged value
of the proportion of means-tested bene￿ts, I ￿nd a comparatively large positive
18e⁄ect on pre-government inequality which is signi￿cant at a ￿ve percent level. This
strongly corroborates with my hypothessis that a more targeted spending structure
is associated with higher pre-government income inequality.20
Regarding the other covariates, model (3) gives weak support for the existence of
an inverted U-relationship of economic development and pre-government inequality.
Yet, this ￿nding vanishes when controlling for the targeting structure of bene￿ts.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that a higher dependency rate is associated with
more inequality in pre-government incomes. Also, post-socialist countries display
signi￿cantly larger levels of pre-government income inequality. As expected from
theory, stronger labor market instiutions are negatively related to pre-government
inequality.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyze if more generous social spending policies are
indeed associated with lower income inequality levels. Particularly it is elaborated
to what extent negative behavioral e⁄ects might counteract the redistributive ￿rst-
round e⁄ects of social bene￿ts. According to the theoretical framework, the overall
e⁄ect of social spending on post-government income inequality is a priori not clear,
since social spending policies are expected to have a positive e⁄ect on pre-government
income inequality. In addition, it is elaborated that di⁄erent bene￿t functions have
di⁄erent objectives and might, thus, be related to di⁄ering distributional outcomes
One major result of the regression analysis reveals that a larger social budget is
strongly related with lower inequality levels in post-governement incomes. This sug-
gests that overall, redistributive ￿rst-round e⁄ects outweigh any inequality-increasing
second-order e⁄ects. This negative e⁄ect of social spending on income inequality is
robust to various speci￿cation choices. Particularly, the e⁄ect remains statistically
signi￿cant when severly reducing the instrument count and when using di⁄erent data
speci￿cations, suggesting a causal e⁄ect of social spending levels on post-government
income inequality. With respect to the inequality in pre-government incomes, I can-
not identify any statistically signifcant e⁄ect of the overall spending generosity of
welfare states. Though, the empirical evidence suggests that if there is an e⁄ect, it is
positive. Looking at the di⁄erent functions of social bene￿ts, the results reveal that
20This ￿nding is also con￿rmed when using OLS as estimation method. However, the e⁄ect
becomes insigni￿cant and negative in the FE model (Table 6 in the Appendix).
19not all bene￿ts are associated with lower inequality levels. More speci￿cally, the un-
employment bene￿ts and public pensions seem to be responsible for the inequality
reducing impact.
Regarding the targeting structure of social policies, the empirical results reveal
that social protection systems which particularly target at low income groups are
not associated with lower inequality levels in post-government incomes. This ￿nding
hints at the importance of possible disincentive e⁄ects created by low income tar-
geting which counteract equalizing ￿rst-round e⁄ects. Additional regressions show
that a higher proportion of means-tested bene￿ts is indeed associated with more
inequality in pre-government incomes. This strengthens the argument that more
low income targeting comes at the cost of substantial negative second-order e⁄ects.
Note, however, that there are limitations to my analysis. First, the analysis only
discusses behavioral e⁄ects which are related to labor market related decisions. How-
ever, social spending policies also a⁄ect pre-government incomes other than purely
through labor market outcomes. Redistributive policies might also a⁄ect the beha-
vior of market actors with regard to investment and saving decisions, geographical
mobility and so on. All these e⁄ects and their impact on inequality are not dis-
cussed. Second, the paper only analyzes the e⁄ect of overall bene￿t levels on income
inequality. However, particularly additional characteristics such as the duration of
bene￿ts and other eligibility crieria might be responsible for the e⁄ects on income
inequality. Thus, to make more speci￿c statements about the distributional and
behavioral e⁄ects of social programmes, more information on the characteristics of
these programmes is needed. This information is also important for speci￿c policy
recommendations.
20Appendix
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Post-Government Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES EU-15 EU-SILC
Lagged Gini Coefficient 0.411*** 0.143 0.615*** 0.408*
(0.108) (0.141) (0.149) (0.214)
Social Benefits -0.227** -0.468** -0.200* -0.273**
(0.084) (0.180) (0.103) (0.103)
GDP pc (in 1000 int $) -0.255*** -0.250* -0.115 -0.126
(0.061) (0.128) (0.075) (0.098)
GDP pc squared (in 1000 int $) 0.002*** 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency Rate 0.149 0.467* 0.406** 0.602***
(0.089) (0.240) (0.161) (0.206)
Prop Secondary Education -0.032 -0.047* -0.012 -0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.035)
Post-communist -4.906*** -2.041 -3.256
(1.640) (1.831) (2.006)
Union density -0.020 -0.049* -0.024 -0.039
(0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.034)
Data 1.033*** 5.828
(0.260) (3.693)
Data * Social Benefits -0.173
(0.130)
Period Effects ￿ ￿
Observations 161 75 183 183
Number of countries 15 24 24 24
No of instruments 48 43 38 39
Sargan test 0.0968 0.753 0.466 0.611
A-B test 2nd-order corr 0.549 0.0601 0.286 0.304
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
structural break'
System GMM estimations with robust standard errors, small sample correction, forward orthogonal
deviations and collapsed instruments. All equations also include external instruments.
Table 5: Data Robustness Checks
21Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Post-Government Income
VARIABLES Coefficient Std.Dev. R
2 Obs.
Pooled OLS
Social Benefits -0.159 *** 0.043 0.908 183
Unemployment -0.096 ** 0.037 0.909 183
Family-related -0.130 ** 0.057 0.909 183
Invalidity -0.062 0.042 0.908 183
Health-related -0.067 0.049 0.908 183
Old-age and survivor -0.039 ** 0.017 0.909 183
Housing and exclusion -0.050 0.061 0.908 183
Means-tested -0.021 (0.033) 0.908 183
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Pre-Government Income
Lagged Social Benefits 0.059 (0.048) 0.898 56
Lagged Means-tested 0.203 ** (0.090) 0.908 56
Fixed-Effects
Social Benefits -0.214 ** 0.108 0.336 183
Unemployment -0.309 *** 0.115 0.358 183
Family-related -0.251 * 0.130 0.346 183
Invalidity -0.268 * 0.147 0.346 183
Health-related 0.075 0.105 0.360 183
Old-age and survivor 0.101 0.088 0.348 183
Housing and exclusion -0.235 0.220 0.339 183
Means-tested -0.039 (0.107) 0.337 183
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient Pre-Government Income
Lagged Social Benefits -0.052 (0.367) 0.536 56
Lagged Means-tested -0.211 (0.416) 0.540 56
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full specifications includes the same additional control variables as the
previous estimations as well as period effects.
Table 6: OLS and FE speci￿cations
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